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INTRODUCTION' 
Consumer protection appeared as a ne\\' area of policy in France and Germany 
in the 1970s. The regulatory approaches adopted by France and by Germany did 
not. however. emerge from deep national traditions of consumer protection. 
Indeed in many areas of consumer regulation such national traditions simply did 
not exist. Instead. the policy models that came to dominate in each country 
emerged from a heated political struggle that took place between producers and 
consumers in the 1970s and early 1980s over the identity of the consumer. At 
stake in this conflict was the degree of responsibility that consumers and 
producers faced for product-related risk . 
Debate over policy solutions took the form of a discussion of the idemity 
and interests of the consumer that was unusually broad. Policymakers faced a 
choice among competing conceptions of the consumer and of the consumer's 
role in society. Three di stinct conceptions of the consumer identity became the 
focus of the policy debate in each country: consumer as economic actor with the 
same status as producers. consumer as citizen with a distinctive set of rights. and 
consumer as interest group. Each of these conceptions of the consumer. 
understood as a policy model. provided a coherent interpretation of the 
consumer's condition. interests, and the kind of solutions that were appropriate 
for consumer protection . Consumer and producer groups therefore advocated 
that conception of the consumer that best met their perceived interests . Who 
won and who lost thi s struggle depended on the relative capacity of consumer 
and producer groups to organize in support of a policy model that best embodied 
their perceived interests. 
In France. where consumer groups enjoyed a strong grass-roots 
mobilization and industry was poorly organized to pursue its collective goals. 
policy outcomes tended to emphasize the interests of consumers over those of 
producers. Indeed policymakers shifted their policy model away from the 
interests of industry as consumer mobilization grew . French consumer policy 
thus came to reflect the conception of the consumer as citizen, and worked to 
advance a protection approach to product market regulation. In Germany, by 
contrast, where producers were well organized and consumer organizations did 
not have a strong membership , policy outcomes instead emphasized the 
preferences of producers. German consumer policy thus came to reflect the 
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conception of the consumer as economic ac tor. and \\ orked tu ach a nee an 
information approach to product market re~ulation . 
This research suggests th at even in period~ of radical institutional and 
policy itlllCl\·ation. familiar inst itutional mechani sm~ can help to e:-;pl:.tin \rhat 
strateg y comes to dominate nati onal policy formation. In thi~ approac h. 
instances of substantiall y ne\\ polic~ · creati on are understood <.I' a 
confrontational process in which competing policy models becume politically 
contested. Each policy mode l makes prescriptions for a coherent strateg~ · of 
regulation. Different policy models are typically mutually incompatible. that i-. . 
they are adopted entirely or not at all. Moreover. the prescription-. from each 
model di stribute burdens differentl y. As a conseq uence. important soc ial actor-. 
compete in the political arena to detennine which policy model will come to 
structure national debate. The policy model that emerges as dominant from tht' 
process th en takes on a path dependency that shapes ongo ing regu latory efforts . 
THE RISE OF CONSUMERISM IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 
The emergence of consumers as a new interest group in France and Germany 
took on a variety of forms that are outlined in thi s section. The changes occ urred 
in diffe ren t publi c arenas. One set of changes occutTed in the legal sphere . It 
included the attribution of co llective rights to consumers. and a redistribution of 
legal li ability from consumers onto producers. A second set of changes occurred 
within the politi cal sphere. it included the integration of consumer 
representatives into policy-making. and th e creat ion of a lnrge new body of 
legis lation focu sed on consumer interests . Finally. consumer groups themselves 
began to expand their activities. their finances . and their membership base. 
Taken together these changes might be seen as const ituting an instance of 
politi ca l incorporation (Marshall 1950 ). Like the earlier political incorporation 
of the working class or of women. the recognition of the consumer interest as a 
fundamental societal interest has entailed the creation of a new legal status for 
consumers . new access to the politi cal sphere. and a new se lf-identification by 
consumers themse lves as constituting a coherent set of soc ial claims. Moreover, 
just as national approaches to incorporating the rights of labor and of women 
have differed across countries , so too have countries enacted product market 
regulations that embody very different conceptions of consumer identit y and 
interests in the economy and society (Lipset 1983 : Koven and Michel. 1990). 
Indeed I argue that the conception of the consumer-as political. legal , and 
economic entity-that emerged in France and Germany in the 1970 and early 
1980s was very different. One of the theoretical challenges of thi s paper is to 
explain such national divergence in a substantially new area of policy . 
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Five trends were common to the emergence of consumerist policies in 
France and Germany. First. consumers were granted right s to act collecti,·ely in 
the legal sphere. although in both countries these rights fell short of the class 
action suit permitted in the United States . In France. the 1973 /oi Ron:r and 
subsequent leg islation permitted consumer groups to sue companies on behalf of 
all consumer groups. although not on behalf of indi,·idual consumers . In 
Germany. first the 1965 competition la,,· and then the 1976 standard contract 
la" · granted consumer groups permiss ion to bring legal suit against companies 
employing mi sleading advertising or unfair contract tem1s. Group right s were 
never extended to other areas of consumer grievance. 
Second. a greater leve l of responsibility for product-related damage was 
attributed to producers. This marked a shift away from a strategy of socializing 
the cost of industry-re lated ri sk that had preYailed through the 19'h Century to a 
strategy of internalizing product-related risk to individual companies. In 
Germany, court cases in 1968 and 1973 reversed the burden of proof on 
defendants. requiring that companies demonstrate that they had not acted 
negligentl y in the case of product-related damage . In France. the courts in 1973 
imposed a no-fault. or strict, standard of liability that made companies legally 
responsible for product-related damage even in cases where no amount of care 
by the producer could have prevented the damage. 
Third . governments 111 both countries incorporated consumer 
representatives into poli cy formati on. In France. a National Council on 
Consumption establi shed in 1965 created a forum for consumer representatives 
to meet with representati ves from the government ministries . France created first 
a Secretariat for Consumption in 1976. then a full Ministry of Consumption in 
1980. In 1976 consumers were given input into the French Plan. Germany 
created consumer advisory councils in the Ministry of Economics in 1972 and in 
the Agriculture Ministry in 1973 . Germany also created an inter-ministerial 
advisory council on consumers. and consumer groups were granted access to the 
concerted action agreements at which money supply and wage levels were set. 
Fourth, both countries began writing a large volume of legislation oriented 
towards consumers. In Germany, for example. the number of consumer-related 
laws grew from a total of only 25 enacted in the post-World War 11 period up to 
the end of 1970, to a total of 338 through 1978 (Laschet 1987, 60). Both the 
Social-Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union created consumer 
working groups to propose new consumer issues. In France the number of Jaws 
and ministerial decrees relating to consumption increased from a total of only 37 
to the end of 1970, to a total of94 through 1978 (Les Notes Bleues 1978, 14-20). 
Finally, the role and activities of consumer groups also grew rapidly at the time. 
Government financial support to these consumer groups increased rapidly over 
this period. In France, for example, funds given by the government to consumer 
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groups gre\\ from 3.7 million francs in 1970 to nearly 50 million francs in 1980. 
Government support had grown over ten times in as many years. German 
government funding to consumer groups grew nearly as rapidly: from I~ million 
OM in 1970 48 million OM in I 980 (Bornecke I 982. 2301. The government in 
both countries sponsored the publication of comparative consumer product tests. 
in the French magazine 50 Millions de consoniiiWteurs and the German 
magazine TesT. Circulation of such product magazines gre,,· to over 600.000 in 
each country by I 980. Private consumer groups reached out to individual 
consumers. providing product information and legal advice. often leading 
boycotts and price surveys. 
This paper does not address the question of why consumer interests 
emerged as a focus of political. legal. and soc ial activity in France and Germany. 
nor why thi s occurred beginning in the early I 970s. Candidate explanations for 
this phenomenon would likely include a combination of factors including 
growing consumer affluence. a downturn in industry profitability. shifting 
strategies of industrial production. and a search by political parties for new 
constituencies. In any case thi s move to acknowledge consumer interests 
appears to represent a common trend in social and political development among 
advanced industrial countries. A similar transition had already occurred nearly a 
decade earlier in the United States. the United Kingdom. and Sweden . Indeed 
these earlier instances of consumer citizenship served as important models that 
helped to shape the policy debate in France and Gem1any. For the purposes of 
this paper the move to grant consumers a new political. legal. and economic 
status is taken to have similar, and admittedly plural. causes in France and 
German y. 
The goal of the paper, instead. is to explain a set of systematic differences 
that emerged in the form of distinctive strategies of product market regulation in 
the two countries. In Germany, the consumer was seen as an economic actor. 
Consumer problems were understood in terms of market failure. Appropriate 
solutions therefore stressed restoring proper functioning of the market, including 
correcting information asymmetries, enforcing an equitable distribution of 
contractual risk . and encouraging competition in product quality. This German 
strategy of consumer protection has been called the inf'ormation model. 
In France, by contrast, the consumer was seen as a political actor. Consumer 
problems were understood in terms of a failure of political rights. Appropriate 
solutions therefore stressed a better political representation of the consumer 
interest, including consumer mobilization , government protection of consumer 
rights , and an insulating of consumers from risks deriving from production. This 
French strategy. which emphasizes the need to insulate consumers from market 
risk, I will refer to as the protection model. It is very similar to the strategy of 
consumer protection that has evolved in the United States. 
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The policy ramifications of these different models of product market 
regulation are elaborated more extensively below. But the core distinction is 
captured by the simplification that the German consumer is treated as another 
producer. while the French consumer is treated as a political constiuency. 
THREE CONCEPTIONS OF THE CONSUMER 
Because consumer protection was a new issue in both Germany and France. 
discussions about specific areas of regulation took place in the shadow of a 
broader discourse about the nature of consumer identity. How was the consumer 
to be understood? Was the consumer primarily an economic actor. or instead a 
political actor? Did consumers constitute a new interest group. or merely a 
collection of unrelated individuals with product grievances? Depending on how 
one answered such questions, different kinds of policy solutions were likely to 
seem more or less appropriate in addressing consumer demands. Because of 
their implications for policy. ideas about consumer identity and the consumer's 
role in modem society became the focus of a policy struggle between the 
interests of consumption and of production. 
Three policy models in particular took center stage in the policy debates 
in France and Germany. See 
Figure 1 below. The first, what might be called the protection 111ode/. 
views consumers as an endangered group in society in need of protection against 
the negative consequences of industrial production. This idea of the consumer 
drew on the experience of the United States. where policies of the 1950s and 
1960s had placed a high burden of responsibility on producers. In this model. 
the consumer is seen foremost as a citizen-consumer. Consumer protection in 
this view is understood as a basic right of consumers. Solutions therefore focus 
on creating new consumer rights, on insulating consumers from market risk, and 
on mobilizing consumers to protect what they perceive to be their political 
rights. Regulatory solutions under this protection model tend to focus on the end 
goal of consumer safety rather than on intermediate procedural goals. This 
protection model also tends to encourage private law approaches to enforcing 
individual consumer rights. A strict standard of product liability. for example, is 
a hallmark of this protection model of the consumer. In legal parlance, the 
fundamental principle of the protection model is caveat venditor. 
A second model , what might be called the negotiation model, views 
consumers as a societal interest group capable of representing its interests 
directly to other interest groups in society. This model is based on the 
experience of the Swedish consumer movement in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
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and it assumes that consumers and producers share many common goals . and 
that through discussions they can come to agreement on a mutuall y-satisfactory 
regulatory approach to consumer protection . In thi s negotiation model. 
consumers are viewed as an important emerging interest group in society. 
Consumer problems are understood to derive from a lack of di scussion between 
consumer groups and producers. Appropriate solutions consequently emphasize 
the creation of forums in which fair negotiations can take place . as well as state 
enforcement of the outcomes of such negotiations. Regulatory approaches in this 
negotiation model tend to emphasize a standard of fairness and encourage 
mediation . A distinguishing characteristic of thi s approach is the Consumer 
Ombudsman. an administrati ve position. first established Sweden in l 971. that 
has autonomy from the government and is charged to spearhead the consumer 
interest in negotiations with industry . The fundamental legal principle of the 
negotiation model is pacta sund servanda. contracts are honored. 
Figure 1. Three Policy Models for Product Market Regulation. 
policy model protection negotiation Information 
Countrv example United States Sweden Bri tain 
Consumer identity citi zen interest group economic actor 
Analysrs of expropri ated rights lack of di scussion market fai I ure 
problem 
Proposed soluti on . create ne" . create forums . pro,·ide 
rights for negotiation consumers with 
• insul ate • make outcome better 
con ~ume rs of negotiations information 
from market binding • reinforce qualit y 
ri sk producti on 
• mobilize 
consumers 
Regul atory . focus on ends . foc us on fair . focus on 
emphasis • encourage di scussions procedure 
pri vate law • encourage . encourage 
en forcement mediati on industry self-
enforcement 
legal principle cm,ear ve11dnr pacra .w11d cm·eat emprnr 
senwrda 
A third model of consumer protection. what has been called the information 
model. views the consumer as an economic actor in society operating on a par 
with other economic actors. including manufacturers. suppliers, and workers. 
This idea of the consumer drew on consumer protection policies that had been 
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developed by the Labour government in Britain in the 1960s and that 
emphasized the need for better consumer information. In this information model. 
the consumer is understood to have the status of another producer. Consumer 
problems are interpreted in terms of market failure rather than as a breakdown in 
political rights. Solutions therefore focu s on overcoming information 
asymmetries between producers and consumers. and on reinforcing the 
mechanisms of quality production in order to offer consumers a better set of 
market options. Regulatory solutions under thi s model focus on ensuring fair 
business procedures and encouraging industry self-regulation . The fundamental 
legal principle of the information model is caveat empTOr. 
Available evidence suggests that policymakers at the time genuinely came 
to think of consumer regulatory issues in these terms. We know that French and 
German policymakers were conscious of these three different options. tirst. 
because they conducted detailed studies of the regulatory approaches adopted by 
other countries. Because the United States, Britain. and Sweden all preceded 
France and Germany in regulating consumer markets. they offered obvious 
models to draw from. In France. these studies took place either in the context of 
the Consumer Committee for the French Plan. or were initiated by consumer 
groups themselves (Genin and Bernard 1963). Ralph Nader was invited twice to 
France in the early 1970s to introduce the US model of the consumer citizen. In 
Germany, the Commission for Economic and Social Change undertook a five-
year survey of the entire German economy that included several studies of 
foreign approaches to product market regulation (Kommission fi.ir 
wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Wandel 1977. chapter 9). Indeed Gennan 
policymakers very seriously considered adopting the negotiation model. what 
they called the Swedish approach (Hoffman 1971. 29). 
In addition to these surveys of foreign regulatory approaches, French and 
German policymakers met frequently in the context of European efforts to draw 
up common standards for product market regulations within Europe. Debates 
occurred both within the Council of Europe (Conseil de I 'Europe 1979) and in 
the context of drafting directives within the European Economic Community 
(Bourgoignie 1987, 95). ' Although none of the EEC directives proved effective 
at the time. they did generate an ongoing debate on consumer issues among 
European policymakers. Moreover, a new Committee on Consumer Policy in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development began publishing 
1 Consumer directives adopted by the Committee of Ministers in the European Economic 
Community included those devoted to door-to-door sales ( 1973 ), misleading advertising 
( 1972), unfair clauses in contracts (1976), after-sales service (1978). consumer representation 
in standardization bodies (1979), consumer education and information ( 1971 and 1979), 
protection and defense of consumer collective interests (1978), consumer legal assistance 
( 1981 ), and consumer access to justice ( 1981 ). 
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annual comparative studies on national approaches to consumer policy in 197:::! 
(OECD 1972). The Journal of Consumer PoliCY. published beginning 111 1977 . 
explicitly compared national approaches to consumer policy. In sum. French and 
Germany policymakers appear to have been extremely well informed about the 
policy alternatives they faced. 










(burden on consumers) 
These three models of consumer protection were also not conceptually arbitrary. 
They can be seen to map out the space of possible responses to consumer 
grievance. A continuum extends between a pure information approach to 
consumer protection, in which consumers are given the tools to make wise 
purchases, and a pure protection approach in which consumers are entirely 
insulated from product ri sk. The resulting space of possible policy approaches to 
consumer protection is depicted in Figure 2 above. The vertical axis expresses 
the degree to which producers are themselves made responsible for product-
related risk. In practice. this dimension corresponds to mandatory safety 
requirements, product liability standards, product recall programs, and such. The 
horizontal axis expresses the degree to which information about products is 
provided to consumers. In practice, this dimension corresponds to standards of 
truth in advertising and labeling, comparative product testing , consumer 
education, and such. 
The concave curve in Figure 2 describes the line of equivalent consumer 
safety. Consumers, in other words, may be equally safe when faced either with a 
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reduced burden o f ri sk and littl e product information. or with a high burden of 
ri sk and a hi gh leve l of information. In practice. o f course. neither solution is 
entire!) sati sfactory. No matter h011 well informed a consumer may be. cenain 
risks necessari ly remain unknown. Similarly. no matter hm1· assiduously product 
ri sks are assigned to producers. certain kinds of losses . especially those to 
consumer health. can never be adequately avoided or remunerated . The curve 
desc ribing equivalent consumer safety therefore neve r full y converges with 
either axis. 
Different strateg ies of consumer protection impose different burdens on 
consumers and producers. A strategy that emphasizes information provision 
places a hi gh burden on consumers. Thi s strateg y conesponds to the information 
model that came to predominate in Germany. Converse ly . a strategy that 
emphas izes risk reducti on places a high burden on producers. Thi s strategy 
conesponds to the protection model that came to predominate in France. But 
there also ex ists a third . compromise strategy. in which consumers and 
producers can jointly benefit by sharing the burden of consumer protection . Thi s 
third option describes the negotiation model. By distributing the burden of 
product safety between consumers and producers. thi s negotiation approach can 
also lower the overall social cost of consumer protection. In sum. the policy 
model s that defined the policy debates in France and Germany were not merely 
ad-hoc bonowing from foreig n ex perience. Instead they appear to map out the 
full range of conceptual solutions to the general problem of consumer 
protection . 
THE CONTESTED IDEAS APPROACH TO EXPLAINING NEW 
POLICY FORMATION 
As described above. three different conceptions of the consumer came to 
constitute poss ible altemative models for how new consumer demands should be 
met. The consumer was either an economic actor similar to a producer, a new 
interest grou p in society that could negotiate its demands with other interest 
groups. or a citi zen with special rights to protection. These different conceptions 
of the consumer implied specifi c policy models for regulating product markets . 
Each policy model entail ed a di stincti ve world-view about the condition and role 
of consumers in society. Yet at the outset no single conception of the consumer 
appears to have been predominant either for policymakers or for the general 
public . Instead. the politics of consumption regulation took the form of a 
struggle between consumer and producer groups over which of these ideas of the 
consumer would emerge as dominant in society. 
This instrumental approach to policy ideas is not new to comparative policy 
analysis. Other researchers have found that interests are often closely tied to 
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ideas in the reguiation of new policy areas. Deborah Stone ha~ argued that 
causal beliefs commonly embody underlying conflict s of interest in d~bates 
about ne'' poliC) . Thus interest groups emphasize different kinds of causal 
belieb depending on their strategic interests (Stone 1989). Geoffrey Garrett and 
Barr) Weingast have argued that ideas can help to encourage cooperation in 
certain kinds of coordination games. When different strategies of cooperation 
are possible. policy ideas can create ··constructed focal points·· that permit actor~ 
to cooperate in achieving their collective goal s (Garrett and Weingast llJ93 ). 
Finally. Pierre Muller has suggested that ne\\" areas of policy should be seen as 
··ideas in action". meaning that ideas about the social identity of a group set the 
tem1s on which group interests in society are contested (Muller 1995). Each of 
these theories sits mid-way in the continuum between the determinacy of ideas 
and of interests. They evoke the multiple roles that ideas may play in ne\\" policy 
formation. They also share the insight that policy ideas work by compel ling 
interest groups to choose from bundled policy solutions. 
In the case of emerging consumer policy. ideas played a three-fold role in 
the process of new policy regulation . First. ideas about the consumer helped to 
draw together and bring coherence to a broad range of policies that had 
previously been seen as unrelated . Under the new concept ion of consumerism. 
regul atory issues as diverse as advertising. product standards. and retail 
contracts came to be understood in terms of a single broader debate in society 
sun·ounding the interests of the consumer. The \'ery idea of a coherent consumer 
interest helped to regroup formerly disparate policies according to their impact 
on a ""new·· societal actor. 
Second. each alternative conception of the consumer catTied with it a 
cvherent analysis of the pwblem and appropriate solutions. Each conception 
thus acted as a policy model. a useful shorthand for a broad set of coherent 
policy proposals spanning the range of consumer issues . Of course, since 
consumer interests were in fact multiple and diverse. no sing le policy model 
could be comprehensive. But for a new policy arena in which the government 
had no practical regulatory experience. each of the three conceptions had the 
advantage of presenting a coherent policy program that could be extrapolated to 
new regulatory issues as they arose. 
The third and final role of ideas about the consumer identity was as a 
focus of policy struggles among the major social actors in France and Germany. 
Indi vidual policy decisions that might otherwise have eluded public debate took 
place in terms of broader conflicts over the relevant conception of the consumer 
identity. These conceptions of the consumer thereby set the terms on which the 
political struggle between producers and consumers was waged in both France 
and Germany. In sum, competing ideas about consumer policy drew attention to 
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the new area of policy. provided a blueprint fo r coherent strategies of policy 
fonnati on in thi s new area. and set the broad terms on which political strugg les 
ove r policymaking were waged. 
These three roles of ideas in the politically-contested ideas approach can 
usefull y be distinguished from two other ways in which ideas have been seen to 
play a role in the fo m1ation of new policies. what might be called the strong and 
weak models of ideas . The strong model sees ideas as encompass ing and 
exclusive. and emphasizes the cogniti ve constraints that national policy 
traditions can place on policy actors (Kato 1996). On thi s vie\\. poli cy makers 
are constrai ned by limited capacities to conceive of possible policy solutions 
because they operate under the influence of unchallenged assumptions. 
persistent discursive styles, unaniculated pred isposition, . even linguistic 
conventions. Peter Hall suggests that such cogniti ve constraint s have the 
character of paradigms in the sense employed by Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 1970). 
''Like a Gestalt. this framework is embedded in the very tem1inology through 
which policymakers communicate about their work . and it is influential 
precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and is not amenable to 
scrutiny as a whole" (Hall 1993. 279). Moreover. Hall argues. thi s policy 
parad igm approach is especiall y powerful in cases of radical-what he calls 
''third order' '-policy change . Strong policy ideas are so powerful that they 
blind policymakers to other possible alternatives. 
The problem with thi s strong model for the role of ideas in the case of 
consumer policy is that major policy innovators at the time show signs of 
ac ti vely searching for a new conceptual framework in which product markets 
might be appropriately regulated . France and Germany considered a broad set of 
regulatory options before pursuing di verge nt policy programs. Government 
officials in both countries commissioned reports on the strategies adopted in 
foreign countries. funded research on the potential impact of different strategies 
at home, and convoked di scussion groups at which domestic interests groups 
could present their ideas and concerns. Far from being constrained by an 
overarching policy paradigm. French and German policymakers appear to have 
been consciously seeking a useful paradigm for the consumerist agenda. It 
therefore seems more likely that policymakers were working from a palette of 
ideas. The role of ideas in the case of consumer policy is thus closer to the role 
that Anne Swidler attributes to culture. In times of policy innovation, ideas. like 
culture. act as a toolbox from which policymakers select based on other 
considerations (Swidler 1986). In thi s instance the selection emerged out of a 
conscious political strugg le between consumer and producer interests . 
. An alternative conception of the rol e of ideas in policy formation that I 
will call the weak model puts ideas in the hands of policy experts . Unlike the 
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strong model. ideas in the weak model do not suffuse society but instead are 
propagated from policymakers at the top. Hugh Heclo. for example. argues that 
policy formation during periods of policy inno\'ation relies on a process of 
"puzzling·· by informed admini strators attempting to fommlate optimal policies. 
Ideas generated within this elite policy setting then diffuse outward through 
society. This is a weak model because it portrays policy ideas as a scarce 
resource controlled by high govemment experts and thereby discounts the 
possibility of a society-wide policy discourse . This style of explanation has been 
repri sed by researchers who study policy networks as the source of distinctive 
national policies. 
ode! of ideas in the case of consumption 
po licy oove ment policymakers did not act together in France and 
in Germany. Instead. new consumer policies rested on a conception of the social 
identity of consumers that arose independently within different spheres of 
govemment. Whereas some regnlations were created through legislative action. 
others were imposed by govemment ministries. Moreover a number of specific 
policy areas were decided almost entirely through the courts rather than by 
legislative or ministerial initiative. Product liability is one example of this kind 
of court-made regulation . Most striking is the fact that these independent court 
decisions about consumers tended to pursue the same national strategies of 
product market regulation as regulations promulgated by govemment 
policymakers. The weak model of ideas. in which govemment policy makers 
propagate expert solutions to policy problems. fails to explain how these 
different policy actors arrived independently at similar conceptions of the 
consumer interest. 
INTEREST ORGANIZATION AND POLICY PREFERENCE 
ORDERINGS 
Consumers face a collective action problem in protecting their interests. The 
problem stems from their large numbers. The benefits of consumer protection 
are diffused among all consumers. while the costs to industry are concentrated 
on individual sectors or even single companies. Because the benefits of 
consumer protection legislation to any individual consumer are necessarily 
small, individual consumers have few incentives to organize in order to protect 
their collective interests (Olson 1982, 18). Indeed, of all collective actors, 
consumers face perhaps the greatest barriers to organization. 
Mancur Olsen describes two broad strategies that permit individual actors 
to overcome free-rider problems in order to pursue their collective goals. The 
first strategy is for representative groups to offer selective benefits to individual 
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members. In the case of workers . who like consumers have faced important 
obstacles to organ ization . trade unions are able to draw in members by offering 
them insurance policies or unemployment benefits . For consumer groups. the 
benefits of membership in a consumer association usually include access to 
useful prod uct information and technical or legal adv ice. This was the approach 
adopted by French consumer groups. The large number of consumer 
publications that emerged in France in the 1970s had the goal of drawing in 
indi vidual members through the information they provided. The early members 
of consumer groups were not connected with trade unions (Wieviorka 1977. 7:.). 
By the late 1970s. however, each of the large French trade unions had created its 
own affiliated consumer groups. Trade union experience with public actions and 
popular mobilization helped further to boost the grass -roots membership of the 
consumer movement. Product boycotts. political rallies. and price surveys all 
con stituted typical consumer group ac ti viti es in France. 
The second strategy described by Olsen for empowering diffu se interests 
is to devolve group decision-making powers to one or more representative 
bodies. These representati ves hold the legal right to speak on issues that bear on 
all consumers. Coll ective wage-bargaining by trade unions is one instance of 
thi s strategy. For consumer groups, pri vileged access gramed by the govemment 
to policymaking forums wi thin the govemmem and with business meant that 
consumer groups did not need to seek an increase in the number of their 
individual members in order to advocate consumer protection policies. This 
approach was adopted by consumer groups in Germany. These groups were 
technicall y specialized and enjoyed privileged access to technical and policy 
discussions by business associations and government mini stries. They thus did 
not work to culti vate a grass-roots consumer membership. Rather than 
competing wi th each other for consumer patronage. individual consumer groups 
speciali zed in specific acti vi ties. such as product testing (S tiftung Warentest). 
con sumer po li cy training (St ift un g Verbraucherinstitut) , and consumer legal 
protection (Verbraucherschutzverei n). Because each of these organi zations were 
formed through legislative action . it is perhaps not surpri sing that they focused 
on technical responsibilities and shied away from consumer mobilization . But 
even regional consumer associations . which were not bound to a single technical 
field. were wary that a grass-roots membership would unduly politicize 
consumer protection and undermine the mi ss ions of their organizations 
(Piepenbrock l lJ87 J. Most sti ll do not permit individual members. This lack of 
popular mobilization around consumerism is puzzling in part because of the 
high level of political activism that Germany experienced during this period 
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around issues such as the en\·ironment and nuclear energy. ' But it wa~ als<' an 
important reason for Gem1an~'s adoption of the information model. 
One Gem1an consumer group that did try to adopt the French approach of 
mass membership and se lective benefits was the Deutsches Verbraucherbund. 
created by Hugo Schui in 1965. In return for a 6 DM annual fee. members 
received a copy of the magazine Der H'ecker ("The Alarm Clock"). legal 
protection against producers and distributors. a 500 DM ~ubsidy to pursue 
indi vidual consumer law suits. and access to inexpensive airline ticket~ to the 
United States. Der Wecker. as the name implies. was radical in appruach and 
launched heavy criticism at the govemment and parliament for their 
complacency in relation to consumers ( Hoffman 1971. 29). Moreover. because 
members of the Yerbraucherbund paid dues . Sdllli was able to offer legal 
support of the kind that government-sponsored consumer groups \\'ere legally 
prohibited from offering. The group had an impressive 50.000 members in llJ70 
(about 4.000 members per year took advantage of the low airfaresl (Der Spiegel 
21 September 1970. 60-61 ). This early success suggests that a grass-roots 
consumer movement of the kind that emerged in France might have been 
possible in Germany. But as government support to official consumer groups 
grew. membership in the Deutsches Verbraucherbund declined. Even tually 
Schui moved to ew York to create Consumers International. 
The different strategies by which French and German consumer groups 
overcame their collective action problems was to play an important role in 
determining what ·model of consumer policy would emerge in France and 
Germany. In France. where consumer groups pursued a strategy of grass-roots 
mobilization. they also became politically powerful. Because of their political 
ir.tluence they were able to push a heavy burden of consumer protection onto 
industry. In Germany. where consumer groups pursued an organizati onal 
strategy of devolved powers that freed them from the need to mobilize 
individual consumers. consumer groups as a consequence had little political 
strength. Instead they culti vated technical competencies that allowed them to 
participate fruitfully in detailed production and policy decis ions. This strategy 
meant that German consumer groups did not have the political power to push a 
heavy burden of consumer protection onto industry. but they did have the 
capacity to engage industry directly on technical questions of consumer safety. 
Consumer policy outcomes in both France and Germany. however, 
depended as much on the organization of producers as on the organization of 
consumers. As David Yogel has argued in the case of the United States, 
2 In comparison ro France. where the consumer movement was strong and the environmental 
movement relat1vely weak. Germany's consumer movement was weak and its environmental 
movement WJS strong. 
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businessmen face considerable obstacles to organizing in order to pursue their 
co ll ective interests in the political sphere (Vogel 1978 . T2 ). As with consumers. 
the extent to which business interests were able to organi ze played an important 
ro le in determining which conception of the consumer would predominate in 
national policymaking. 
In Germany. where producer groups enjoyed strong associational ties and 
were organi zed under strong sectoral trade assoc iations. industry was able to 
meet consumer protection issues with a unified pos ition. In France. where 
industry was less organi zed. and individual companies were not bound by 
sectoral associations. industry came to the policy table with a fragmented 
position and fewer capabilities for se lf- regulation. A more detailed exposition of 
the role played by the organi zati on of production interests in France and in 
Germany appears in the di scussion of policy preferences below. In general. 
however. the result of the differing organizational forms of production was that 
German producers enjoyed both a higher level of political power and also a 
greater capac ity for effecti ve se lf- regulation than did their French counterparts. 
Policy Preference Rankings of Consumers 
Consumer interests are potentially di verse. The policy-preference rankings of 
French and of German consumer groups have therefore tended to emphasize 
those consumer interests that also refl ect the organi zational strategies of 
consumer movements in the two countries. In France. where the consumer 
movement is founded in grass-roots mobilization and political engagement. 
consumer groups have favored approaches that build on mobilization. Hence 
French consumer groups have favored negotiati ons with industry and lobbying 
for further legal protections of consumers. both acti vities that draw on their 
strengths in mobilizing consumers. They have been less enthusiastic about the 
info rmation strategy, since that approach tends to treat the consumer as an 
indi vidual rather than as a politi cal or group actor. In general. French consumer 
groups prefer first the negotiation approach, then the protection approach, and 
fin all y, in last place, the information approach. 
This was true in product labeling, consumer contracts. advertising , and 
product quality standards. where French consumer groups gave their strongest 
endorsement to negotiated solutions. In I 975 , the eleven major French consumer 
groups proposed a general framework law ("loi cadr~") that would pennit them 
to negotiate binding contracts with industry on a broad range of policy issues.' 
They al so proposed the formation of a "high council on innovation and safety" , 
3 Un 11w nde en 1110uvemellf: le~· organisations de consommation (Paris : Mini stere de 
l'economi e -- Com1te nati onal de la consommation . September 1980). 
' 
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with an equal representation of consumers. professionals. and government 
officials. with the goal of giving safety and design input to manufacturers. and 
of identifying so-called '"false innovations" that were expensive for society and 
burdensome to consumers .' The consumer group OR-GE-CO. allied with the 
major French trade unions. strongly supported direct consumer group 
negotiations with industry as a productive approach to consumer protection 
(Dubois 1977, 2). 
The second most-favored option of French consumer groups. less-faYored 
than the negotiation model but more favored than the information. was the 
strategy of protection by the creation of special consumer rights . From an 
organizational logic, the protection approach was less satisfying for consumer 
groups than the negotiation model. since it did not draw on a vast organization 
of consumers. Nonetheless consumer groups lobbied hard for higher safer~ 
standards, better contractual terms. and greater industry responsibility. all 
hallmarks of this approach. While they did not object to higher quality 
information, especially when it resulted from negotiated agreements with 
industry. they were skeptical that information alone could adequately help 
consumers . Truth in advertising, for example. was not an imponant policy issue 
for French consumer groups. When the government proposed a set of negotiated 
quality labels in 1976, the Federal Consumption Union (UFC) objected on the 
grounds that it should not substitute for real product quality (Comite national de 
la consommation 1984, 3). As summarized in Figure 3 below. French consumer 
preference ranking for strategies of consumer protection was first negotiation. 
then protection. and least of all information. 
Figure 3. Polic~· Preference Rankings of Consumer and Producer Groups. 
Preference COnS/IIIler f! rO/IfJS CO/ISI/IIII'r gr<J!IfJ.\' Producer i11terest.1· 
' 
ran kings Fren ch Germa11 Fm11ce a11d Germa1n· 
First negotiation negotiation information 
Second protection information negotiation 
Third information protection protection 
German consumer groups have pursued an organizational strategy different from 
that of their French counterparts . This different strategy has generated a different 
policy-preference ranking . German consumer groups had few individual 
members and relied instead on privileged access to negotiations . They measured 
their success not in terms of consumer support, or their own weight as a political 
force, but instead in terms of their expenise and their access to government and 
business decision-making. This organizational strategy has caused German 
4 "Onze organisations d'usagers proposent une charte nationale", Le Mo11de, 30 April 1975. 
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consumer group to emphasize technical skills rather than mobilization. They 
have thus tended to favor both negotiation and infom1ation models. since both 
strateg ies emphasize their organizational strengths. The protection model was 
the least favored approach of the German consumer movement because. by 
making consumer issues political. it ri sked undemuning the consumer 
movement ' s own privileged access to policymaking . Consumer groups in 
Germany preferred first the negotiation approach. as in France. then the 
information approach. and least of all the protection approach. 
While both German and French consumer groups preferred a negotiation 
approac h to consumer protection . The conception of negotiation of Gem1an 
consumer groups was somewhat different from that of their French counterparts . 
French groups saw thei r role in negotiation as that of aggregating broad 
consumer interests. German consumer groups. by contrast. perceived at the 
outset that they simply did not have the political power or popular legitimacy to 
negotiate on an equal political foot ing with business. In the early 1960s. for 
example. Germany's leading consumer association . the Association of Consumer 
Groups ( AgV ), had been pushing for the creation of a Consumption Ministry 
within the government. This would have given the AgY authority to speak on an 
equal footing with industry. But by the early 1970s the AgY had changed its 
position. oppos ing a separate consumption n1ini stry and pushing instead for 
access to consumer policy comnuttees within the economics and agriculture 
ministries. 
Because they had little membership and no independent basis of political 
power. German consumer groups were dependent for their policy access on the 
good wi ll of the government. The Social-Democratic Party-dominated coalition 
of the 1970s proved enthusiastic in integrating consumer groups into policy 
circles. As examples of this. in 1973. consumer groups were granted access to 
the multi-party Concerted Action negotiations of wage and money supply levels. 
In 1974 they were given access to technical commi ttees within Germany's 
technical standards-setting body. Deutsche Industrie Normung (DIN). And in 
1976 they were given an important role in monitoring .standard consumer 
contracts. 
In exchange for this access to government policy, German consumer 
groups tended to avoid confrontation with industry. Thi s aversion led to strong 
consumer-group opposition to the protection strategy. When the German trade-
mark association criticized the Ag V for conducting comparative product tests, 
for example. the AgV simply stopped. When the president of the Federal Cartel 
Office (Bundeskartellamt) called for the creation of a single office for consumer 
and competition policy. the president of the AgV opposed the idea out of 
concern that the new body would undermine the status of the AgY as an equal 
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partner with industry (Eberhard 1973. 39). Indeed the AgV opposed any state-
regulated consumer politics. and strongly opposed a stat~-run consumer. 
protection bureau ( V.' imchati und Wertbt!H "erh October 1973. 665-666). Most of 
the major consumer legislative initiatives in Gem1any were initiated not by 
consumer groups. but instead by industry or by political parties (Schatz Jl)8~. 
338). The conceptual essence of the protection strategy was consumer 
confrontation with industry . to which German consumer groups were entirely 
opposed. 
The information model of consumer protection was the second-favorite 
option for German consumer groups. Consumer information becam~ the 
foundational activity of consumer protection. especially for regional consumer 
associations (Verbraucherverbande). But the AgV also participated . In 1973. for 
example. the AgV send two buses on a tour through Gem1any under the slogan 
""together for reasonable prices" ("Gemeinsam fUr verni.inftige Preise"") . 
Brochures were handed out. educational movies were shown. and computerized 
tests of consumer's knowledge of product prices were offered (Glockner 1973 ). 
The primary focus of French consumer groups was to collect consumer 
complaints and present them to industry: one of the main focuses of Gem1an 
consumer groups was to gather product information and present it to consumers. 
As summarized in Figure 3 above. German consumer preference ranking for 
strategies of consumer protection was first negotiation. then information. then 
protection. 
Policy Preference Rankings of Producers 
As opposed to French and German consumer groups. French and Gennan 
industry had very similar ideas about consumer policy. In both countries. the 
primary concern of business was to avoid government interference in production 
decisions. Hence businesses evaluated the three policy models in terms of the 
level of regulatory intervention they were likely to generate. Among the three. 
the information model appeared the least restricti ve to business . Indeed 
businesses in general recognized that better informed consumers could be more 
responsive consumers. For Germany's leading industry association, the Bund 
Deutscher Industrie (BDI), the greatest goal of the government was to help the 
consumer help herself to work through the enormous amount of information that 
might otherwise leave her the weaker market partner. Industry groups favored 
information strategies. such as product labeling and consumer education . that 
were objective and neutral. They especially favored school education about 
consumer issues and government support of product advisory centers. France's 
leading industry association, the National Council of French Employers (CNPF), 
also emphasized the usefulness of a program of consumer information: 
"consumer information is the condition of a true freedom of choice: a poorly or 
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insufficiently informed consumer has no real freedom of dec ision .. (CNPF 
Parrnnm June 1976. 15). 
In second-place preference. after the information modeL business in both 
France and Germany preferred the negotiation model of consumer protection . 
While this put them face to face with consumers. it had the benefit of avoiding 
direct government intervention. Germany's standard-setting group. DIN. for 
example. accepted the creation of a consumer adv isory board within its 
administration in exchange for a high degree of autonomy and freedom from 
government intervention . In France. the CNPF became an enthusiastic 
proponent of the negotiation approach when faced with the probability of direct 
government intervention. Indeed the CNPF created a special committee. the 
Commission on Industry. Trade. and Consumption (CICC ) with the explicit goal 
of negotiating with consumers. In the case of consumer terms of sale. for 
instance. the CICC negotiated with consumer groups for two years before their 
effon ~ were brought to a halt by direct regulatory intervention by the 
government ( b~{urmmion Consommmion OR-GE-CO May-June 1976. 6) . 
The least desirable consumer policy for producers was the protection 
model. This approach implied a high leve l of government intervention to enforce 
a new strong set of consumer rights. In France. industry was extremely critical 
of the Consumer Safety Commission (CSC) that was put in place in 1983 to 
regulate products in the interest of consumer safety . They cri ticized the fact that 
any of several ministries could bring cases. the fact that even trade unions could 
appl y for product reviews. and the . new Commission's strong powers to 
investigate producers (Garrigou 1981 , 11 ). Both French and German industry 
opposed product recall actions , for example, because of concern that they could 
be politically motivated and disrupti ve to industry (Micklitz 1990, 418). For 
industry in both countries, the preference ranking for strategies of consumer 
protection was tirst information, then negotiation. then protection . See Figure 3 
above . 
POLICY CONFLICT OVER NATIONAL MODELS OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION 
The way in which producer and consumer interests were organized in France 
and Germany played three different roles in policymaking. First, as described 
above, the organization of consumer groups drove their ranking of policy 
preferences. Second, for both consumers and producers, their degree of 
coordination determined their ability to apply political pressure in favor of their 
preferred policy approach. Third, the degree of coordination of producers in 
particular determined their ability to implement certain strategies of consumer 
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protection. The way in which consumer and producer interests were organized 
thus set their preference rankings. their political power. and their capacities to 
implement their preferred policies. These three different roles interact In a 
complex way to generate policy outcomes. 
Because of thi s complex interaction. policy formation in ne\\' areas of 
policy often has an internal dynamic . In France. for example. the process of 
consumer policy formation lasted for nearly ten years before a stable polic~ 
model emerged. In Germany. a different set of institutional constraints allowed 
policymakers to arrive at a stable policy solution after only a short period of 
deliberation . By paying close attention to the different roles of interest 
organization we can gain an understanding of the internal dynamics by which 
even radically new areas of policy are formed. 
One way of mapping the political dynamic of new policy formation is to 
employ an asymmetric preference game based on the preference rankings of 
consumer and producer groups concerning alternative policy models. From the 
policy preference rankings ·of those groups we can adduce an ordinal payoff 
schedule. The lowest policy preference of each actor receives 0 points. the 
second policy preference receives I point. and the highest policy preference 
receives 2 points. Since French and German consumer groups had different 
preference rankings. emerging from their different strategies of organization. 
their payoffs are accordingly different. Producer preference rankings. and policy 
payoffs, are the same in both France and Germany. Consumer and producer 
policy payoffs are summarized in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Policy Payoff Schedule for Consumer and Producer Groups in France and 
Germany. 
Preference cmzsumer groups consumer groups Producer imerests 
rankings French German Frunce mu/ Gemu11n· 
Information 0 I :?. 
Negotiation :?. :?. I 
Protection I 0 0 
I 
In Germany, both consumers and producers had a common lowest preference, 
the protection model. Conflict therefore emerged only over which interest group 
would achieve its higher-ranked option. In this conflict the weak organization of 
the consumer movement placed limits on its ability to achieve its preferred 
policy, the negotiation approach. Moreover, the strong organizational capacities 
of industry in Germany permitted them industry to make the information 
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strategy an effective policy tool for consumer protection. German policy 
therefore came to favor producer over consumer policy preferences. 
In France. by contrast. where the first preference of producers - the 
infom1ation model - corresponded to the third preference of consumers. The 
process of policy formation was therefore more dynamic . Early consumer 
protection initiatives favored industry by adopting the information model. As 
consumer mobilization increased the political influence of consumers. however. 
this information model became contested. The policy model therefore shifted to 
negotiation. This negotiation model. representing the first preference of 
consumers and the second preference of producers. was the socially optimal 
policy in that it offered the greatest combined payoff. Yet this strategy also 
failed. primarily because of the inability of French industry associations to 
impose negotiated solutions on individual companies. As a consequence. France 
shifted to it s final position. the protection model. Because it was the second 
prr.ference of consumers and the third preference of producers. this policy can be 
seen as a victory for the consumer movement. Interestingly. however. the 
protection model also represented the worst social outcome (that is. the worst 
combined score) for producers and consumers. 
The Evolution of Consumer Policy in France 
French consumer policy proceeded in three stages. In the first stage. from 
roughly 1970 to 1978, consumer policies focused on the information strategy. 
This was the particular emphasis of policies under the first Secretary of 
Consumption. Christiane Scrivener. from 1976-1978. This policy approach 
represented the best payoff for producers and the worst payoff for consumers. 
As consumers mobilized over the course of the 1970s. they became unsatisfied 
with this information model. The third Barre government of 1978 began the 
second stage of French consumer policy. in which consumers and producers 
espoused the negotiation model of consumer protection. Consumer and 
professional groups met to work out standards for all aspects of consume 
protection policy. By 1983, however, both sides had become disenchanted with 
the negotiation approach. The core problem was that French businesses were 
unable to negotiate agreements in a collective way. So long as all companies 
were not bound by agreements . individual companies were hesitant to 
participate for fear of suffering a competitive disadvantage. Hence in 1983 
French policy moved to the third stage. in which policy reflected the protection 
strategy. New government policies attempted to push full responsibility for 
product-related risk onto producers. They also began to encourage private legal 
enforcement of these new consumer protections. 
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Figure 5 below describes the payoff levels of these different stages for 
consumers and producers . 
Figure 5. Consumer Policy Payoff Matrix for Producers and Consumers in Franct'. 
COIISIImers 
Mobilized nm mobili zcJ 
Negoti ation model in fo rmation model 
organized (I. 2 ) (2. 0 \ 
producers S/a ~t' 2 ( I 978-83 ) ST<I !fl' I ( I 970-7o J 
Protection model 
not organized (0. I ) 
sta~e 3 ( 1983-1 
France 's early initiatives in consumer protection, in the first policy stage. 
focused on providing consumers with accurate information . This policy 
approach was pushed most strongly by France's first Secretary of Consumption. 
Christiane Scrivener, appointed to the position in 1976 under the second 
government of Raymond Barre. Scrivener. who had just returned from the 
Harvard Business School with a mid-career MBA degree . was focused on the 
economic role that consumers should play in the economy (Miraval 1977). 
"Their information", she wrote, "determines the very orientation of our 
economy" (Scrivener 1972, 2) . Her program for consumer protection included 
four "axes of action" that embodied the information model: (I) incorporate 
durability into the design of products, (2) give consumers more information 
regarding durability, which manufacturers collect, (3) require improved 
documentation and construction that allows consumers to keep their product 
longer, and (4) create regulations to help the second-hand market function 
properly (Scrivener 1978). 
Some of Scrivener's specific policy initiatives for improving consumer 
information relied on market mechanisms. She pushed to legalize comparative 
advertising in France, for example, on the grounds that this could provide 
consumers with valuable information. She also called for French companies to 
create their own consumer relations offices that could communicate individually 
with consumers (Scrivener 1977). But Scrivener also felt that in many cases the 
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strategy of consumer protection through accurate information required direct 
state intervention. She pushed policies that targeted both information and 
education. Information policies included a ne\\' standard for quality cenificates. 
with the Ministry of industry imposing a minimum standard of quality for all 
products (Prevost 1979 ). In 1977. Scri vener introduced consumer education into 
the elementary school curriculum (Garrigou 1981. 93 ). A law with similar effect 
. the refonne Haby , called for consumer education in technical schools. The 
curriculum of this education had a strong commercial content. including such 
topics as the way to distinguish a real Camemben (Bert 1977). 
Yet this information strategy that Scrivener had come to represent was 
being challenged by a very different conception of the consumer as an interest 
group. Writing in 1977, Michel Wieworka noted that French consumerism at the 
time seemed to have two modes: "On the one hand. [product] scandals that by 
their high social visibility give a sudden importance to general consumer themes 
and to groups dedicated to consumers: on the other hand. a sustained effon. 
much less popular. tending towards informing middle-c lass consumers" 
(Wieviorka 1977. 245 ). ' This emerging conception of the consumer as having a 
collective interest was latent in society. As early as 1973. the loi Rorer had 
proposed granting consumer groups the right to file class action suits. although 
this law was later diluted through court interpretation (La Croi.r 29 June 1974 ). 
Indeed business had proved quite open to negotiating directly with consumer 
groups on issues that related to consumer information (Hu111anis111e er Enrreprise 
April 1977. 13-19). Already in 1970 the CNPF had collaborated with the state-
run consumer group INC to negotiate standard product labels. In 1976 the 
Consumption Committee of the French Seventh Plan proposed the creation of an 
ongoing di alogue between consumers and producers. including representation of 
consumer groups in the associations that manage product information (France's 
standard setting body AFNOR, the labeling body AFEJ. etc). The Consumption 
Committee also suggested that thi s negotiation approach might be employed to 
eliminate abusive contract clauses and to simplify consumer litigation (Dubois 
I 976. 1-2). 
This negotiation approach to consumer protection became the onhodoxy 
of the Third Barre Government, which was inaugurated in 1978. and was 
especially championed by the new Economics Minister. Rene Monory. 
Monory's tenure marked the beginning of the second stage of French consumer 
protection . He was an economist by training, and believed that the best approach 
to consumer protection was not through greater government regulation but 
5 
..... d'une part . des scandales qui par leur forte visibili te sociale donnent une importance 
soudame aux themes generaux du consumeri sm et aux organisations qui s'y consacrent; 
d 'autre part. un effort soutenu. nettement moms populaire, axe sur un effort d'information sur 
la consom mati on de couches petites-bourgeoises" . 
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instead was through empowering consumers to represent their interests directly 
to business . To symbolize thi s view. he eliminated the position of Secretary of 
Consumption. Instead. he publicly referred to himself as the "Minister of 
Consumption'" . and advocated that government financial support to consumer 
groups be quadrupled in hi s first two years in office (De111ocrnril' Modern£' 22 
November 1979). "We need to make producers and distributors realize·· . 
Monory wrote. "that the consumer should become a partner in all things. and 
who participates at all levels : from product manufacturing to price se tting·· 
(Marchand 1979).6 He felt. in particular. that inflation might be held down if the 
two million current members of consumer groups in France were to join in a 
single organization (Le Nmn•eau Journal. 28 September 1979). 
The negotiation approach. which had been proposed by consumer groups 
in 1975 (Dubois 1977. 2). was also increasingly accepted by business as a useful 
alternative to direct government intervention. Ambroise Roux. the head of the 
CNPF. felt that consumer groups ''should be encouraged and developed' ' (Roux 
1976. 29 ). From November 1979 to 1981 the CNPF met monthly with consumer 
groups to discuss consumer issues as diverse as advertising. automobile sales. 
after-sale service. and others (Lavergne 1981. 22). Between 1980 and 1983. the 
newly created Conseil National de la Publicite (CNP) negotiated with consumer 
associations to set standards for advertising. The Conseil contained 
representatives of 11 consumer organizations and 11 representatives of the 
media (CNPF Parronar July 1983. 71). Similar efforts to have consumer and 
professional interests negotiate agreements were being undertaken at the 
regional and local level throughout France. 
By the beginning of 1980. however. French consumer assoctat10ns had 
become frustrated that industry was not actually abiding by negotiated 
standards. In a letter of January 1980. the 11 major national consumer 
associations renounced participation in all collective agreements with the state 
and with business until an enforcement mechanism was established (Fen·ier 
1996, 80). Their answer came with the 1981 Socialist victory of Francois 
Mitterrand. Mitterrand proposed in his campaign platform. the I 10 ProposiTions 
for France. that ··consumer assoc iations must be supported" (Poiree 1984. 36). ' 
Emphasizing the importance of the consumer, Mitterrand created a Minister-
level position dedicated to the consumer interest, with the explicit goal of 
promoting negotiations between consumer groups and professional interests 
6 "11 faut faire comprendre aux producteurs et distributeurs . expliquc M. Monory, que le 
consommateur doit devenir un panenaire a pan entiere, qui panicipe a tous les niveaux : la 
fabrication des produits comme la formation des prix" . 
7 "11 faut renforcer les associations de consommateurs. C'est une des priorites de mon action 
car je crois que l'on ne peut rien faire avec des consommateurs atomises dans la nature et 
qu'on ne peut rien faire si tout est concentre au niveau de I'Etat" . 
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( Con.wmnwTeurs AcwaliTes 4 September 1981. 5-6). In September of 1981. the 
newly appointed Minister of Consumption . Catherine Lalumiere. said in an 
inter\'ie\\·: .. 1 believe that \\'e can do nothing with individual consumers in the 
state of nature . nor if all effort is concentrated at the state level .. (Doyere 
19S lal · 
The solution that the government proposed was that consumer groups be 
treated emerging labor unions had been in the past. By this analogy. industry 
should be given the responsibility of making binding agreements with consumer 
groups. Consumer advocates agreed that the interests of consumers deserved a 
legal status simi lar to that of labor interests (Que Savoir June-July 1982. 53). To 
this end, Lalumiere appointed the consumer activist Jean Calais-Auloy head of a 
committee to rewrite the consumer law so as to incorporate existing regulation 
into a negotiated framework (Doyere 1981 b). This corporatist solution was 
applauded by consumers but strongly opposed by industry . The Paris Chamber 
of Trade and Industry (CCIP) criticized the Calais-Auloy committee for its lack 
of industry representatives (CCIP 1982. 16). French business was simply not 
sufficientl y organized to negotiate on an equal footing with consumer groups. 
and foreseeing correctly that the diversity of their interests could put them at a 
disadvantage to consumers (CCJP 1983. I 0). The CNPF strongly opposed 
treating consumer relations in the same way as labor relations (Rochard 19820). 
They argued that professional associations could not sign binding agreements 
with consumers because consumer groups were not trul y representative. and 
be<.:ause consumer groups did not have the technical training properly to 
consider the issues that would be involved (Aubertin and Robin 1981 ). The 
Ministry of Justice sided with industry. arguing that the analogy between 
consumers and labor unions was not legally valid (Ministere de la Justice. 1980). 
Finally. the financial crisis of 1983 put an end to Lalumiere's corporatist 
aspirations . 
This policy collapse signaled the move to the third Stage of French 
consumer policy, in which consumers would be protected through state 
regulations and interventions designed to shift the burden of product-related risk 
fully onto producers . This policy was embodied in the 1983 law for consumer 
protection that created the Consumer Safety Commission (Comission pour la 
Securite des Consommateurs, or CSC), modeled on the US Food and Drug 
Administration (Yaysse 1992). Government Ministries were granted 
extraordinary rights to survey the consumer market and to call for products to be 
withdrawn. In 1985 France endorsed a state-sponsored consumer defense by 
joining the function s of consumer protection, competition, and repression of 
8 "Je crois qu 'on ne peut rien faire avec des consommateurs atomises dans la nature et qu'on 
ne peut rein faire si tout est concentre au ni veau de l'Etat". 
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fraud in the new General Direction of Competition. Consumption and the> 
Elimination of Fraud (Direction Generale de la Concurrence. de la 
Consommation et de la Repression des Fraudes. or DGCCRFl (Fily and 
Guillennin 1992). It is this protection model that remains the dominant strategy 
of consumer protection in France today. 
Stasis in Consumer Policy in Germany 
Because German consumer groups ranked their preferences for the altemative 
consumer protection models differently. the payoff matrix for the German policy 
game looks different from that in France. See Figure 6 belo''. Two general 
observations can be made. First. because the protection model was the lowest 
preference both of consumer groups and of producer groups. it never came imo 
play as a viable policy altemative in Germany. ' This means that most policy 
debates in Germany took the form of conflict between the! negotiation strategy 
and the protection strategy. Second. while the information model favors 
producer preferences and the negotiation model favors consumer preferences. 
the combined payoff of the two models are the same. Given the weak 
mobilization and political force of the Gem1an consumer movement. and the 
strong organization and political weight of German industrial associations . 
Germany's adoption of the information strategy followed nearly as a matter of 
course. Critical to this outcome was both the weakness of Germany's consumer 
movement. and the strength of Germany's industrial associations. 
German consumer protection policy began with and has maintained an 
emphasis on the information model of consumer protection. Consumer input 
into policy making. in this approach. has taken the form of technical advice 
rather than strong interest representation. In 1973. for example. the German 
Ministry of Justice convened a discussion group to decide a course of action for 
regulating consumer contracts. Nearly 150 of the most prominent production 
and labor associations attended. Consumer groups were invited. and half a dozen 
attended. However the strong attendance by industry and labor representatives 
simply overwhelmed the consumer advocates. so that consumer interests did not 
figure strongly in the final proposed legislation. The resulting law on standard 
contract terms (Gesetz zUr Allgemeingeschaftsbedingungen , or AGB-Gesetz) 
thus closely reflected industry interests (Schatz 1984, 68). Without greater 
mobilization, Germany's consumer groups were unable apply political pressure 
for policies they favored . 
9 
Indeed, when the protection strategy was proposed in European Economic Community 
discussions. for example in the negotiations for a product liability directive, German 
consumers and producers concurred in their opposition . 
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Figure 6. Consumer Policy Payoff Matrix for Producers and Consumers in Germany. 
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The negotiation approach was considered but never employed in Germany. 
While German industry accepted a monitoring role for consumer groups in 
regulations treating consumer information. policymakers stopped short of giving 
consumer groups an equal negotiation position in relation to producers. In 
advertising, for example, consumer groups were given a policing role in 
ensuring that Germany's high standard of advertising was met (Schricker 1975. 
189-190). But legislation blocked consumer groups from seeking remuneration 
for consumers who had been deceived by illegal advertising (Stein 1979). As the 
Free Democratic Party (FOP) explicitly warned, any class-action suit focused on 
consumer claims would be unacceptably profitable for consumer groups. risking 
to put them in a stronger bargaining position in relation to industry (FranJ.:(urrer 
Rundschau 28 January 1982). A similar dynamic emerged in product labeling in 
Germany. In 1974. Germany's labeling organization (Deutsches Institut fi.ir 
GUtesicherung und Kennzeichnung ) proposed that minimum acceptable safety 
standards for products be negotiated outside of the industry standard-setting 
organization. DIN. by a committee composed of equal members from consumer 
and producer groups. While industry favored Iabeling, they objected to the 
influence that this arrangement would give consumers in setting product 
standards (Bundesan zeiger 23 March 1974 ). Under pressure from industry, the 
Economics Ministry refused to support the project, and a new 
Produktinformation (PI) system was created by the Association of German 
Industry (BD!) that effectively removed government and consumer influence 
from labeling decisions (Bopp-Schmehl et al. 1984, 86). In sum, industry 
accepted collaboration with consumer groups in the interest of pursuing an 
information strategy of product market regulation , but stopped short of acceding 
to equitable negotiations with consumers. 
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German product market regulation favored the interests of industry not 
onl' because of the political weight of producer groups but also because they 
were committed to a strategy of producing hig h-qualit~ · goods that made the 
information model an attractive approach to product safety. As David Soskice 
and Wolfgang Streeck ha Ye argued . the structure of relations between producers 
and their suppliers. workers. and capital in Gem1any have pu shed German 
producers towards a production strategy that emphasizes high-quality products 
and incremental innovation (Soskice 19%: Streeck 1992 l. Not only has this 
strategic bias towards quality given German industry a genuine interest in an 
information so lution to consumer protection . it has also made the information 
model a highly anractive solution for German regulators. After all. the 
information solution to product risk depends not onl y on providing consumers 
with accurate product information. but also on the availability of high quality 
goods capable of lowering consumer risk. 
Consistent with the information approach. Germany has given industry a 
high degree of autonomy in setting safety standards. German y's Equipment 
Safety Law (Geratsicherheitsgesetz. or GSG). for example. does not itse lf 
specify minimum safety standards. but instead makes standards established by 
industry. in the context of DIN. mandatory for all producers (Bopp-Schmehl 
1984. 10 l ). The Economics Ministry did force DIN in !974 to accept consumer 
representatives on technical standards corru11ittees relating to consumer 
products. But these representati ves act in a technical rather than in a 
representative fashion . They are outnumbered on these committees by 
representatives from industry. and have no formal veto power over decisions on 
standards (Joerges et al. 1989. 186). Similarly. the negligence standard that 
Germany applies to cases of product liability provides for producer exculpation 
if the company can show that accepted manufacturing practices were followed 
(Tebbens 1979. 74-75). The goal of German ri sk regulation , in other words. is to 
enforce industry-set standards of product design and manufacturing on all 
producers. in the understanding that industry itself holds the greatest knowledge 
and capability to ensure that high quality goods came to market. Product 
standards in thi s approach could not be subjected to negotiations between 
producer and consumer groups. as the negotiation model advocated. 
To summarize. in Germany. where producers were well organized and 
consumer groups had few members. producers were able to secure their 
preferred option. the information model. The information model was the second-
ranked preference of consumer groups. In France, where producers were loosely 
organized and consumer groups enjoyed a strong mobilization, consumption 
policies shifted over the course of the 1970s and early 1980s away from the 
policy preference of producers and towards the policy preference of consumers. 
By the mid-l980s, France had adopted the protection model. This approach was 
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the least favored option for industry. and only the second option of most 
consumer groups. In thi s specific sense. the product market regulations that 
emerged in Germany can be called producer-oriemed. as they favored the policy 
preferences of producers over consumers. By contrast. French product market 
regulations can be called consumer-oriemed. since they favored the policy 
preferences of consumers over those of producers. 
LESSONS FROM FRENCH AND GERMAN PRODUCT MARKET 
REGULATION 
This paper has both a substantive and a methodological conclusion. The 
substanti ve conclusion concerns the institutional prerequisites for different 
strategies of consumer protection . In general. in countries like France in which 
consumers mobili zed at the grass-roots level and producers were disorganized. 
as they were in France, consumer policies tend to reflect consumer interests 
rather than producer interests. Consumer groups with strong membership could 
cultivate political interest in their cause by portraying the interests of consumers 
as uni versa! interests. Boycotts and rallies organized by consumer groups 
demonstrated the political weight of these groups. Industry. for its part. was not 
sufficiently organized to offer a viable alternative to the influence of consumer 
groups in the form of se lf-regulation . This resulted in a political conception of 
the consumer identity and a focus on a strategy of consumer protection that 
placed a high burden on industry. This French approach drew heavily on the 
reg ul atory strategies adopted in the United States. where a similar logic of 
consumer and industry organization predominated. 
Converse ly. in countries such as Germany in which consumers did not 
mobilize and producers were organized, consumer policies tended to embody 
producer interests more than consumer interests. Industry associations were able 
to coordinate their efforts in order to push for the idea of consumers as purely 
economic actors . Consumers for their part were politically weak. and therefore 
unable to push for the idea of distinctive consumer rights. Moreover. consumer 
groups were themselves wary of a more confrontational approach to consumer 
protection. for fear that they would lose their monopoly on representing the 
consumer interest in government and business discussions. This combination of 
consumer group accommodation and industry initiative resulted in an economic 
conception of the consumer ioentity and a focus on a strategy of consumer 
information . 
29 
Figure 7. Interest Organization and Consumption Regimes. 
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Alternative combinations of consumer and of producer organization strateg ies 
help to shed light on the consumer policies adopted in other countries. Where 
consumers have been mobilized and business is also organized. for example. a~ 
is the case in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries. consumer policies have 
tended to rely on a strategy of negotiation between consumers and producers in 
order to set consumer policies . Why did consumers groups in these countries 
pursue a strategy of mass mobilization'l The consumer groups there were able to 
build on strong cooperative movements whose members were already mobilized 
around consumer issues. '0 Over 13 percent of all stores in Sweden were 
cooperatively owned in 1960, compared to less than 3 percent of stores in both 
France and Germany (Jefferys and Knee 1962. 65). Because both consumers and 
producers were politically strong, the government encouraged them to negotiate 
standards of consumer protection that were binding on both parties. 
In general , when consumers are mobilized and industry is disorganized. as 
in France, we should expect a protection approach to consumer policy to 
emerge. This model also appears to represent the approaches adopted in the 
United States and in Canada. When consumers are not mobilized and industry is 
organized, as in Germany, we should expect an information approach to 
consumer policy to emerge. This model appears to represent the approaches 
adopted in Spain and in Austria. Finally, when consumers are mobilized and 
businesses are organized, the situation emerges in which a negotiation strategy 
prevails. This model appears to describe the consumer policy setting in Sweden 
10 In 1967 consumer cooperatives accounted for 18 percent of commerce de detail in Sweden 
(Chevalier 1982, 4). 
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and indeed in all of Scandinavia. Finally. in the case where consumers are not 
mobili zed and business is di sorganized. consumer policy is likely to be 
haphazard and weak. Thi s mode l appears to prevail in Britain today. 
As a second conclusion. thi s study also suggests a methodological approach to 
explaining policy divergence in cases of radical innovation . This approach 
focu ses on politically contested ideas. In substantially ne\\ areas of public 
policy. alternative ideas about how the new policy should be addressed set the 
terms of po litical contestation. Such alternative ideas ha ve the status of policy 
model s. in that they imply comprehensive but exclusive conceptual frameworks 
for regulation. Which policy model came to dominate policy- making in each 
country depends on the interests and institutional form of the important 
economic actors in each society. 
In such ne\\' policy areas, group interests are linked to their organizational 
forms in at least three ways: 
I. 
3. 
The way in which group interests are organized can affect their 
policy preferences. We observe this in the different preference ranking 
of French and German consumer groups. In general this will be true of 
newly-emerging interests that do not have a previous tradition or 
understanding of their economic. social. or political situation . 
A greater capacity to organize group membership confers a greater 
political weight. We observe, for example. the growing political 
weight of French consumer groups as they increase their grass-roots 
membership . 
The institutional capacity of interest groups places constraints on 
the kinds of policies they can successfully pursue. Gemmn industry. 
for example. was well coordinated to pursue an information strategy to 
consumer protection . whereas French industry lacked sufficient 
coordination among individual companies. 
Thus economic interest groups confronting radically new areas of policy resolve 
their conflicting preferences among policy models through a political contest. 
the outcome of which is strongly influenced by the way in which t+heir group 
interests are organized. 
This strategy of explanation does have two significant limitations. First, it 
does not conceptualize the institutional context of policy making, but instead 
treat s the policy process as a black box . This approach therefore ignores policy 
theories that focu s attention on the structure of the state such as bureaucratic 
phenomena. agenda-setting, or veto points (Crozier 1964; Immergut 1992). But 
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thi s blindness to the functi oning of the state al so has advantages. In the case of 
product market regulati on. fo r example . my research finds th at the parli ament. 
the mini stry of economics . and the court system all contri buted substantiall y tn 
th e shape of product marke t reg ul ati ons in both France and Ge rmany. Any 
th eory based on c lose institutional ana lysis of the state \\Ouid ha ve to explain 
hO\\ such different institutions consistentl y pushed for a similar regulatory 
strategy. The contested-ideas approach assumes that go ,·emment policies reflect 
the preferences of societal inte rests in proporti on to the po liti cal po\\'er and 
o rgani zati onal capac ity of the ir advocates. T his simple mode l a lso he lps tu 
exp lain hO\\ countri es ,,·ith such di ffe rent gove rnment structures. such as France 
and the United States. have adopted very simila r stra tegies of product market 
regul ation. 
The second limitation of the contested- ideas approach is that it does not 
address the ori gi ns of consumer and producer organizational strateg ies. French 
and Ge rman industria l organi zations have roots in thei r nineteenth-century 
ex peri ence o f industriali zation. As such. they precede the debote on consumer 
protecti on by nearly a century. But the different organi za ti onal strategies o f 
French and Gem1an consumer groups had a far more recent o ri g in . emerg ing 
only in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In thi s context. the contested- ideas 
approach arti fic iall y se parates the question of consumer group organi zation from 
the broade r question of product market reg ulation. 
Despite these limitations. the contested-ideas mode l of po licy formation 
offers two advantages fo r comparati ve po li cy ana lys is. First. it suggests that 
instituti onal analys is need no t limit it s ex planatory scope to instances of poli cy 
continuity. but that it can al so offer powerful insights into periods of radi cal 
p;:, licy change . If policy e ·:olution is understood as a process of punctuated 
equilibrium. thi s research suggests that the fi e ld of comparati ve politi cs can 
appl y the too ls of institut iona l anal ysis to ex plain not j ust th e equilibrium but 
also the punctuati on. Second . it suggests that the core role of ideas in new policy 
formation is to elaborate coherent. competing reg ul ato ry strategies. not to blind 
policy makers to possible altem ati ves. Ideas in th is approach work to clarify 
rather than to obscure. For contemporary socia l acto rs. ideas clarify the tradeoffs 
they faced from alternati ve reg ul atory models. Rather than dri ving specific 
regulato ry outcomes. policy ideas become themse lves the focus o f famili ar kinds 
of politica l contestati on. 
Gunnar Trumbull 
RSC for Advanced Stud ies. EU I (Flo rence) 
trumbull @ iue. it 
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